

Technically political: The post-politics(?) of the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme

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ABSTRACT

Globally, the creation and implementation of climate change policies continues to be contested amongst politicians, international institutions, and civil society. Carbon markets, designed to incentivize greenhouse gas emission reductions, are one of the main climate mitigation approaches worldwide. Existing scholarship highlights how carbon markets provide fertile ground for research into the changing nature of environmental governance and political contestation. Swyngedouw locates carbon markets as part of broader “post-political” changes, which reduce alternative pathways through “depoliticisation”. MacKenzie, in contrast, argues that carbon markets are a form of “techno-politics” that provide new avenues for politically designed markets. This paper engages with and contributes to these scholarly debates by exploring the creation and operations of the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme between 2003 and 2016. We demonstrate how New Zealand policy-makers employed various discursive constructs that emphasized uncertainties (in climate science, in international climate policies, in markets) as a means to justify “urgent” and “exceptional” state interventions into the emissions trading scheme. These interventions emphasized the role of experts and the experimental nature of New Zealand’s carbon market, and employed parliamentary processes that limited public participation. Such moments of state intervention in a nation with a strong history of neoliberal governance both reinforces and complicates existing scholarship about the “depoliticisation” of climate change and the role of the state in post-political neoliberal governance. It highlights the ways in which rendering climate change a technical challenge can translate into democratically-worrying moments of state-initiated but expert-led approaches to environmental governance.

1. Introduction

Post-political neoliberal capitalist values dominate and underpin the majority of international institutions, agreements and national policies designed to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Knox-Hayes and Hayes, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2009; McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). Government efforts to mitigate climate change, we argue, are thoroughly situated within global post-Cold War post-political configurations centred on managerialist, technocratic approaches to governance (Swyngedouw, 2009, 2010). Carbon markets (carbon/emissions trading) exemplify post-political neoliberal framings and frequently reiterate the devotion to ‘less state’ (less formal government) in the name of good governance, efficiency and optimal socio-economic organization and resource management (Bryant, 2016; Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010; Mackenzie, 2008). The creation of carbon markets has involved rendering climate change into a “singular socio-chemical component (CO₂)” (Swyngedouw, 2013: 4)

which can be expertly measured, managed, traded and mitigated by selected actors through market-based mechanisms (Koteyko et al., 2010; Bumpus and Liverman, 2008; McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). In short, carbon markets epitomize the project of neoliberal ‘market rule’ (Castree, 2008: 132). Over the last decade, a wealth of scholarship critiquing the framing of climate change as a chiefly economic problem has emerged (Bryant, 2016; Liverman, 2009; Mackenzie, 2008). Scholars challenge the use of carbon markets on the grounds of both mitigative efficacy (that markets are ineffective mechanisms by which to reduce GHG emissions) and legitimacy (climate change being symptomatic of market capitalism and the high-carbon economic status quo) (Andrew and Cortese, 2013; Manuel-Navarrete, 2010). Scholars further contend that such approaches can engender the increasing centralisation of state power despite continued, outward adherence to less state (Keil, 2009; Li, 2007b), which belies the appropriation of crisis for political ends, and thus points to dangers for democratic legitimacy and transparency (Jessop, 2002). In this paper we engage with these

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intellectual interrogations of the politics of carbon markets, including the ways in which carbon markets are: embedded in processes of post-political neoliberalisation; sites of exceptionalism whereby neoliberal democratic governments can enact interventionist environmental governance regimes to regulate markets; and are therefore contradictory technical experiments (Bryant, 2016; Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014; Knox-Hayes and Hayes, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2009; Li, 2005).

We contribute to existing academic engagement with carbon markets by examining the creation and operation of the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZETS). The NZETS, like all carbon markets, is an emergent political experiment in the mitigation of climate change: it is continually being calculated, performed and experimented into effect through ongoing processes of marketisation, politicisation and scientisation via assemblages of human and non-human actors (see Callon, 2007: 541). The New Zealand (NZ) Government has been at the forefront of these assemblages since the scheme's conception, rendering the NZETS an ideal object for analyzing actually existing (and often problematic) climate governance in a post-political terrain, with the intersection of the elements of state, market (non-state) and science (see Callon, 2010, 2009).

We take the contextual (pre)conditions and decision- and policy-making processes, identified in the existing NZETS literature (see Richter and Mundaca, 2014; Price and Duffin, 2013; Bullock, 2012; Bertram and Terry, 2010; Jiang et al., 2009; Moyes, 2008) (and summarised in Figs. 1 and 2), and provide a critical genealogy (Cryle and Stephens, 2017; Waitt, 2016) of the NZETS spanning 2003 (before its inception) to 2016. By tracing how this State program has been made

and remade across several election cycles we demonstrate that the scheme is a series of moments or episodes of state intervention to govern climate change through market mechanisms, and we thereby challenge dominant depictions of markets as a priori entities governed by an invisible hand (see Callon, 2007, 2010; Castree, 2008; Brenner and Theodore, 2002). We deploy critical discourse analysis to establish the dominant but contestable underlying logics and ideologies that were communicated by, predominantly, NZ's two main center political parties (which alternated roles as the NZ Government and Opposition during this time) and that ultimately determined the scheme's enactment (see Baars, 2015; Cahill, 2014; Cameron, 2012; Law and Urry, 2004).

We demonstrate how the NZETS involved decision-makers simultaneously re-framing the threat climate change poses to the status quo (the country's high carbon economy and neoliberal capitalism) into a technical issue that fitted within the hegemonic neoliberal paradigm, as well as conceptualising carbon markets as sites of ongoing state-directed experimentation that exist outside the bounds of normal democratic decision-making processes. The state-led interventions, we demonstrate, not only contradict the ethos of the post-political neoliberal NZ State, but also reveal a worrying tendency away from democratic deliberations towards expert-led authoritarian forms of decision-making in NZ (see Thomas and Bond, 2016; Alakavuklar and Dickson, 2016; Geiringer et al., 2011).

This paper starts with an overview of key scholarship about the framing of climate change as a technical, economic problem and the politics of carbon markets. After reviewing some of the main scholarly




Fig. 1. Timeline showing the New Zealand climate change policies 1992–2017.




Fig. 1. (continued)

debates surrounding the environmental modernization of climate change, we outline our case study and the qualitative methodology we employed in this research. Lastly, we present and discuss the findings of our analysis of state-level discourses (by Members of Parliament (MPs) in the debating chamber), a representative cross-section of which is presented in Table 1.

2. Literature

2.1. Market environmentalism and carbon markets

Market environmentalism conceives climate change as an economic externality to be addressed due to its potential to hinder efficiency; its solutions are therefore also economic (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014; Pellizzoni, 2011). Carbon markets are products of this economic framing of climate change, which emerged from late 20th century international climate change agreements. The new commodity of carbon created through this type of climate governance renders mitigation a global market opportunity that stimulates new rounds of capital accumulation, what Bumpus and Liverman (2008: 127) term “accumulation by decarbonisation”. Within this paradigm, the economic status quo remains largely unchallenged and the priority of economic growth is reinforced as legitimate and even necessary in the mitigation of climate change (Swyngedouw, 2013; Spash, 2010; Fletcher, 2010; Liverman, 2009).

A political ecology counter paradigm proposes that the ‘metabolic rift’ at the core of capitalism renders achieving environmental health

through economic growth paradoxical (Foster et al., 2010; Harvey, 2006). Encapsulated in the catchcry sustainable development, the promise of growth alongside mitigation conveniently simplifies the process of reducing GHG emissions (the drivers of climate change) and serves as a “disavowal of the multiple, complex and often contingent relations through which environmental changes unfold” (Swyngedouw, 2013: 4; see also Wright and Nyberg, 2014; Roper, 2012). This means sustainable development is at best, derived from misguided optimism or, more critically, is a strategic, superficial ‘greening’ of business as usual (Carolan, 2004; Luke, 1999).

Besides examining the mitigative (in)efficacy of mechanisms like carbon markets, a wealth of scholarship explores the contestation of climate change policy and governance in connection to these strategies (Knox-Hayes and Hayes, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2013; Spash, 2010; Liverman, 2009; Callon, 2009). Carbon markets occupy a range of scales and spheres. Carbon markets sometimes derive from political negotiations and connect to international mitigation systems although just as often they are developed in a voluntary capacity and involve both local and international buyers of emissions reductions (Knox-Hayes and Hayes, 2014). In some cases, carbon markets are deployed as funding mechanisms for other mitigation schemes, as in the case of REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) projects (see Arild Angelsen, 2017). We draw on interrogations by Callon (2009: 535), who describes carbon markets as “between in vitro and in vivo experiments” meaning, respectively, mitigation tools designed and tested in economic theory and policy mechanisms trialed through continual re-formation and customization in practice. From




Fig. 2. Brief overview of how the NZETS operates.

this perspective, the policy outcomes of carbon markets are dependent on the design and operations of the experiment therefore offering spaces for improvement in what MacKenzie (2009: 440) refers to as the "politics of market design". MacKenzie aptly terms this political landscape "techno-politics" because it is found not only in formal political arenas but also in sub-political spaces (such as scientific and financial accounting bodies) that make "technical" pronouncements that shape the operations of carbon markets (Lovell and MacKenzie, 2011; MacKenzie, 2009: 453). However, the attitude to carbon politics and carbon markets promoted by MacKenzie (2008) is heavily criticized by Swyngedouw (2010: 225) and other scholars (see Li, 2007b, 2005; Wright and Nyberg, 2014; Andrew et al., 2010).

2.2. Post-politics and post-political neoliberal governance

Swyngedouw (2010) argues that carbon markets are evidence of the "depoliticisation" of climate change and a broader societal shift towards "post-political" and "post-democratic" governance arrangements under neoliberalization. Swyngedouw (2010: 225–227) argues that, in contrast to "proper democratic political" approaches, post-politics is underpinned by a managerial logic enacted by very specific, typically private sector and/or transnational actors and actions. The political is reduced to merely administration wherein decision-making is deemed most appropriate when it is apolitical, efficient and streamlined (Swyngedouw, 2013; Hajer and Versteeg, 2005; Oels, 2005) and is therefore tasked a question of expert (be it scientific or financial) knowledge and not of political ideology or democratic engagement (Swyngedouw, 2013; Manuel-Navarrete, 2010). Whilst citizens can partake in deliberation, their roles are limited to those of stakeholders within the economy (be it passive taxpayers or more influential representatives of economic sectors) and are able to share in amelioration only through choices made as consumers (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014; Manuel-Navarrete, 2010; Splichal, 2009). The post-political terrain thus suggests the narrowing of (climate) politics to matters of administration and technical organizational method in a way that reduces

the spaces for alternative pathways because it potentially forecloses politicization and evacuates dissent (Swyngedouw, 2009).

Li's (2005: 389) term "rendering technical" captures this process of technocratization, whereby issues are deliberately removed from the space of political discourse and recast in the supposedly "neutral [and therefore unchallengeable] language of science" (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 196; Brenner and Theodore, 2002). Similar scholarship exploring knowledge as power under the post-political condition (Waitt, 2016; Knox-Hayes and Hayes, 2014) observes that it is these specialized, esoteric knowledges, discourses and calculations that allow "governmental interventions" to claim objectivity and efficiency (Ryan, 2015: 87), and become the moments from which the state derives its legitimacy within a largely marketized political economy (Storey, 2008; Grundmann, 2007). Climate change is a prime entry point for such "corrective interventions" (Li, 2007b: 6), demonstrated by the introduction of carbon markets, which are simultaneously performed and justified through technical language and calculative practices, with certain scientific knowledges used to render climate change and mitigative responses technical (Li, 2005: 389; Swyngedouw, 2009, 2013).

Persistent normative understandings of what interventions and actions (or inactions) by governments are considered appropriate and justified (Waitt, 2016; Dardot and Laval, 2013), have prompted critical research that highlights the on-the-ground messiness and contradictory post-political processes at work in a variety of national contexts (Ryan, 2015; Peck, 2010). Such research draws heavily on historical materialism and the work of Polanyi and Marx, thereby revisiting the analytical dimensions of governmentalities, hegemony, power and the state (Cameron, 2012; Li, 2007a, 2005). Keil's (2009: 231) concept of "roll-with-it" neoliberalism, for instance, captures the more nuanced realities of neoliberal governance, which is inherently embedded, evolving and at times contradictory (see also Ryan, 2015; Cahill, 2014; Castree, 2008).

Scholars like Keil (2009) emphasize that there has not been a retreat of the state, as anticipated in neoliberal theorizing, but rather a "transformation of state action" (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 216; Stedman

Table 1

Summary of key climate governance discourses used by politicians in the House of Representatives, 2003–2016 (adapted from Diprose et al., 2016: 163).

Discourses	Representative example quotes
Market vs. Tax	<p>“[C]arbon trading... should actually mean less emphasis on regulatory solutions, not more. The whole point of having a price is to get dynamism and innovation, which a regulatory system cannot deliver” (English, 2007: 12088) <i>National MP</i></p> <p>“[E]conomic instruments cannot achieve environmental goals without putting them in a regulatory framework” (Fitzsimons, 2005: 20412) <i>Green MP</i></p>
Sustainable Development and Leading the World (Labour’s Key Discourse)	<p>“We need to be part of the solutions to the world’s biggest problems, and certainly not a reluctant last mover” (Clark, 2008: 14077) <i>Labour Prime Minister</i></p> <p>“[J]ust about everything one does in the name of climate change makes sense for other reasons” (Parker, 2008d: 18063) <i>Labour MP</i></p> <p>“[B]y bringing the future forward one advantages the NZ economy rather than damaging it” (Hodgson, 2005a: 20224) <i>Labour MP</i></p>
Economy/Environment Trade-off and Feeding the World (National’s Key Discourse)	<p>“On climate change, we campaigned on NZ not being a laggard nor being a world leader, but doing our fair share” (Smith, 2009b: 5752) <i>National MP</i></p> <p>“[T]he Government will not sacrifice our economy, it will not sacrifice our businesses, it will not sacrifice our people and economy on the altar of environmentalism” (Korako, 2016: 1) <i>National MP</i></p>
Exceptionalism (Uncertainty and Experimentation)	<p>“[T]he only certainty is that there is ongoing uncertainty and the need for further amendment” [of the ETS legislation] (Dunne, 2008: 14837) <i>United Future MP</i></p> <p>“We are essentially trialling here an administrative system of great complexity and potentially enormously important economic effects. If ever the old phrase ‘the law of unintended effects’ applies, I would argue it applies here... both in respect of the technical provisions of an ETS and the substantive provisions of the ETS it is intended to facilitate” (Groser, 2008b: 19252) <i>National MP</i></p> <p>“The Australian Government is not exactly clear where it is going, the world carbon price is very difficult to predict, and the effect of recession on carbon emissions is also very difficult to predict” (English, 2009b: 1527) <i>National MP</i></p>
Urgency	<p>“In New Zealand’s short electoral cycle, it is not an option for the Government to shut up shop in election year to campaign. We have got big policies to roll out and progress this year” (Clark, 2008: 14077) <i>Labour Prime Minister</i></p> <p>“The Government was on a timetable dictated purely by the political needs of the Labour Party and the PM” (English, 2008: 18075) <i>National MP</i></p> <p>“This is a time of year when the legislative programme starts to cramp up quite considerably” (Brownlee, 2009: 7900) <i>National MP</i></p>
Expertisation	<p>“When I think of urgency, I think of tackling climate change” (Hughes, 2010: 16317) <i>Green MP</i></p> <p>“The issue of climate change is one that has been driven by science more than any other international public policy issue in human history” (Hodgson, 2003: 7244) <i>Labour MP</i></p> <p>“We cannot manage what we do not measure” (Smith, 2010: 12723) <i>National MP</i></p> <p>“There will be \$43.3 million to be spent on bureaucrats within the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry alone, to try to find out how the ETS will work and how to implement it” (Carter, 2008b: 16546) <i>National MP</i></p> <p>“[T]he same methodology is used as is audited by the UN auditors every year in accordance with the rules under the Kyoto Protocol” (Parker, 2008b: 16002) <i>Labour MP</i></p> <p>“I do not make inquiries; I have discussions with my officials” (Groser, 2014b: 18476) <i>National MP</i></p> <p>The EPA “was established precisely so that the difficult decisions could be taken independently and without the involvement of us mere politicians[. p]olicy agencies operate best when there is less dependence on direction of that sort.” (Simpson, 2015: 4777) <i>National MP</i></p>

Jones, 2012). The state still acts as a regulator but, at least in theory, the primary objects of its regulation now occupy non-state spheres (Centeno and Cohen, 2012; Amable, 2011; Jessop, 2002). As the state is increasingly charged with the upkeep of conditions for effective market functioning, it becomes inextricably involved with powerful, unelected actors operating in private spheres (Ryan, 2015; Li, 2005; Brenner and Theodore, 2002). This raises potentially serious implications for legitimacy, democracy and accountability (especially when political power is appropriated with limited or prescribed consent as democratic subjects and procedures are considered hindrances to state power) (Waitt, 2016; Bruff, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2009; Splichal, 2009; Tilly, 2003).

Like Swyngedouw (2009), Bailey and Wilson (2009: 2325) connect the neoliberal and techno-centric values institutionalized in carbon markets to path dependency and lock-in effects that create major barriers to considerations of alternative interventions, specifically more eco-centric approaches to reducing GHG emissions. This narrowing of boundaries reveals a highly politically-driven form of climate governance which is far from de- or apolitical, a contradiction captured by Swyngedouw’s (2013: 1) notion of the “non-political politics of climate change”. Indeed, as scholars Ryan (2015) and Grundmann (2007) observe, expert advice, which is used to legitimate state responses, frequently fails to be incorporated into policy (and practice) when it does not fit within existing agendas.

The post-politics framing is not without its critics. McCarthy (2013:

20–24), for instance, questions whether post-politics is a new phenomenon, and considers historical examples of (unsuccessful) attempts to enact depoliticized models of environmental policies, such as the management of public lands in western United States of America at the end of the nineteenth century. Due to fears of a “timber famine”, federal government reversed more than a century of land policy and enacted new policy and established new institutions aimed at keeping large areas of forests in permanent federal ownership as a way to manage timber resource use sustainably. During this so-called Progressive Era, the federal government pronounced that natural resource management should be depoliticized, that is, based on technical expertise and implemented by bureaucracies, in turn “rendering their interactions with the public ‘apolitical’” (McCarthy, 2013, p. 21). The competing powerful political and economic interests of agents means that, despite deferral to supposedly apolitical scientists and technocrats, “almost every moment of environmental governance was shot through with politics all along” (McCarthy, 2013: 21).

Attention to the longer history of political contestations over environmental policy reveals how the “potentially analytically flat, totalising and inadequate... sweeping categories” that the “post-political condition” assumes obscure contemporary examples of “proper” (environmental) politics (McCarthy, 2013: 19–20). MacKenzie’s (2010) account of techno-politics, for instance, largely excludes the institutional power of the state from analysis, and Swyngedouw’s (2010: 227) is directed at the change from the state of “government” to types of

“governance”. Thus, McCarthy’s focus on the structural position of governments in regulating the environment under capitalism adds much needed depth and nuance to thinking about state (in)actions to “manage” the environment and reminds scholars to consider long-standing power structures, systems and actors which act as barriers to transformations towards more sustainable climate futures (O’Brien et al., 2009). Nel (2017: 145) achieves this by taking an assemblage approach to navigate “the contested making of carbon forestry” in a diverse range of contexts, particularly at the project level. Indeed, across scales (global to local) climate change debates, governance, and responses are dominated by powerful actors and interest groups (Knox-Hayes and Hayes, 2014). As Li (2007b: 20) observes: “[w]inners and losers do not emerge naturally through the magic of the market, they are selected” (Li, 2007b: 20).

Considering the scholarship overviewed above, we contend that the NZETS is part of the wider post-political condition wherein neither politics nor policy-making are ended or reformed, but rather the fundamental conditions in which policies are imagined, produced, introduced, and monitored are radically altered (see Bayliss and Saad-Filho, 2015: 17). As Thomas and Bond (2016: 5) argue, NZ politicians (practitioners within state institutions) adopt a technocratic apolitical managerial style towards political affairs on the basis that it supposedly produces better decisions and policy outcomes. The prolific use of parliamentary urgency in NZ, including around the NZETS, is one example of this process (Geiringer et al., 2011). Urgency is a device available to MPs to make progress on business that the regular sitting hours and rules of the House would not allow for, such as introducing and passing a bill through all stages in a single sitting, oftentimes removing the select committee stage (Geiringer et al., 2011). While not all instances of urgency jeopardize democracy, because urgency sees the House sitting for protracted periods of time and attending only to those matters that are prioritized by government members it does constitute a state of exception and should thus be reserved for extreme or plainly justifiable cases (Geiringer et al., 2011). Our research follows on from existing scholarship about social contract theories that continues to contest the degree of legitimacy of state authority and intervention (see Pelling et al., 2012; O’Brien et al., 2009). We therefore specifically probe the ways in which the NZ State justifies and legitimizes intervention in the NZETS (Geiringer et al., 2011; Thomas and Bond, 2016). Further, we identify how moments of state intervention render the NZETS experimental and “exceptional” on a number of fronts (Moyes, 2008: 913), and contribute towards the state of exception being the dominant “paradigm of government” in NZ (Thomas and Bond, 2016: 3; see also Alakavuklar and Dickson, 2016).

3. Context

Environmental governance in NZ illustrates the tensions between neoliberal capitalist ideology and the need and desire for a healthy natural environment, both prominent within NZ’s socio-political landscape (Roper, 2012). NZ is an oft-cited forerunner in the deployment of neoliberal politico-economic reforms during the 1980s (Jessop, 2002; Lewis and Moran, 1998), a decision that continues to variously shape planning and policy-making conditions to the present day, and to which climate policy is no exception (Cooper and Rosin, 2014; Kelly, 2010; Lewis, 2009). By taking the lens of ‘progressive spaces of neoliberalism’ (Lewis, 2009), these continuing moments are (potentially) generative of positive outcomes. An example of this is the incentivization of native tree planting engendered by the NZETS. However, like both the tourism and agricultural industries, this too exemplifies the economic optimization of NZ’s natural environment (Hopkins et al., 2015; Richter and Mundaca, 2014; Bührs, 2008). The branding of NZ as ‘clean and green’ and ‘100% pure’ therefore stands in marked contrast to environmental realities, with increased degradation closely linked to the intensification of productivist dairy farming (Rosin, 2013; Jay, 2007) and impacting upon NZ’s GHG emissions profile.

Climate governance in NZ was set in motion through ratification of the UNFCCC in 1993 and the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 (see Fig. 1). Assessing the effects of climate change is thus a requirement under NZ law (Lawrence et al., 2015). Under the first Kyoto commitment period (CP1), NZ agreed to reduce its GHG emissions to 1990 levels. NZ’s emissions profile differs from many other Annex 1 countries and reflects the dominance of the pastoral agriculture sector (Hopkins et al., 2015; Bullock, 2012: 658; Kelly, 2010). In 2012, NZ’s carbon emissions accounted for 45 per cent of total GHG emissions (Annex 1 average 81 per cent), while methane and nitrous oxide, typically associated with agricultural production, were both higher than the Annex 1 average and contributed to just over half of NZ’s total GHG emissions (UNFCCC, 2012). The GHG emissions covered by the NZETS therefore include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases; the scheme uses the carbon dioxide equivalent (CO₂-e) as the measure of how much warming is caused by different gas types in reference to carbon dioxide.

Political debates about climate change in NZ over our study period primarily involved the two main political parties: the Labour Party (center-left) and the National Party (center-right), as well as smaller parties with which the main parties formed confidence and supply agreements. These parties included: the left-wing Green Party of Aotearoa NZ; the center-left Māori Party and the center-left Progressive Party; the centrist parties NZ First and United Future; and the right-wing ACT NZ (Hopkins et al., 2015). The NZETS was established by the Labour Government under the Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Act 2008. While there was broad consensus amongst the political parties in terms of the reality of climate change (Hopkins et al., 2015: 562), from 2003 to 2008 the debate was virtually reduced to a stalemate over Labour’s proposed carbon tax, supported by the Green Party, and the reactionary politics of most other parties against this mitigation mechanism. A key concern over the carbon tax was about equity, namely “who pays for the transition to a low-carbon economy, and how” (Bertram and Terry, 2010: 19). This saw the debate fall broadly along traditional party line divisions. The lack of consensus over climate mitigation in the lead-up to CP1 (2008–2012), from which time NZ would be liable for emissions in excess of the agreed target, culminated in the abandonment of the proposed tax and the hasty enactment of the NZETS just prior to the 2008 general election.

NZ’s political system is unicameral, consisting of one parliamentary chamber. Due to this configuration, alongside the lack of a written constitution, NZ’s legislature is subject to the Government of the day (Geiringer et al., 2011). For bills to be passed into legislation or existing legislation to be amended, a simple 51% majority in the House is required (Geiringer et al., 2011). The select committee process is, therefore, highly important since democratic procedures can be undermined if this stage is truncated, as can occur under parliamentary urgency (and deferral to external experts) (Geiringer et al., 2011). The NZETS was both enacted and amended, by Labour and National, respectively, under urgency conditions.

Beyond parliament and the NZETS, broader political action and activism is a feature of climate politics in NZ (Diprose et al., 2016). Non-governmental environmental organizations such as Generation Zero, Coal Free Aotearoa and 350.org are all involved in mobilizing support for more intentional climate policy, more stringent emissions targets and practical ways of meeting these targets. Generation Zero, for example, is a youth-led organization aimed at encouraging NZ to transition away from fossil fuels through low-carbon transport options and creating more liveable cities to meet net zero carbon emissions by 2050. The group organizes community events and, in 2017, they initiated a public petition for the creation of a Zero Carbon Act. The proposed legislation was later supported by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment and as of 2018 is being developed into a bill by the newly elected Labour-led Government (see Fig. 1). Other climate action taken in 2017 includes the Leaders’ Climate Change Declaration, which was signed by mayors from around NZ and called on

the government to take stronger action to reduce GHG emissions and also demanded more proactive steps to address climate change adaptation at a community level. There are also numerous small-scale mitigation initiatives across the country which operate independent of the NZETS, including manuka honey farming amongst regenerating forests, local-level forestry projects to create carbon sinks, and native tree planting incentive schemes (Hayward, 2017).

4. Methods

This research employs critical discourse analysis (CDA) to examine the discourses around the state-led experiment of the NZETS. As a social constructionist analytical technique, CDA recognizes the malleable, non-static and pluralized nature of discourses and realities (Waitt, 2016; Hajer and Versteeg, 2005). Although climate change is conceptualized in a multitude of ways (Arnall et al., 2014; Roper, 2012), certain discourses and narratives purported by powerful stakeholders and decision-makers are prevalent (Arnall et al., 2014; Roper, 2012). CDA, therefore, offers an effective method by which to identify and analyze climate change discourses at a national level and explore how discourses are (re)produced by those in positions of power, such as the state (Waitt, 2016; Myerson and Rydin, 1996).

We focus our analysis on the years 2003–2016. This period captures the ongoing reflections on the NZ Government's CP1 ratification in 2002 and the emergence of the NZETS. This period is also significant because it includes the transition from a Labour Government to a National Government and the lead up to the Copenhagen Conference (COP) in December 2009, where world leaders sought to agree to a post-Kyoto Protocol framework. The adoption of a “longitudinal strategy” (Geiringer et al., 2011: 7) to understand shifts in leadership and changing political engagements with climate change allowed us to capture: the increasing salience of climate change in NZ formal governance; NZ's international responsibilities; parliamentary debates around potential responses (carbon tax and market); and discussions about the enactment and operations of the NZETS.

NZ Parliamentary speeches, debates, votes and questions to ministers and members documented through the NZ Parliamentary Debates (NZPD) were the primary data sources for this research. NZPD are publicly available official records offering a wealth of information that is particularly relevant to our research since the NZETS proposal was tabled within parliament, and parliament is where its policy settings continue to be discussed. Data were obtained from the NZ Parliament website using a keyword search “climate AND change” for the years 2003–2016 to capture both NZETS as well as other speeches on climate change. We ran an additional keyword search using “emissions AND trading AND scheme” for the years 2008–2016 to ensure all NZETS-specific material was gathered. Once data were collected, we adopted a four-step process for analysis: (1) data familiarization through close reading of the NZPD; (2) tabulation of data to enable manipulation and management of data; (3) coding (Cope, 2017); and (4) identification of the following themes: expertization; concerns over democratic procedure (urgency and exceptionalism); significant demonstrations of ideological debate; and sustainability rhetoric. Below we present our analysis as a critical genealogy of the NZETS from before its inception under Labour to its operationalization by National, followed by the teasing out of key state maneuvers and moments in which the scheme was made and remade.

5. NZETS critical genealogy: findings and discussion

The NZ Government, as a powerful institution issuing powerful discourses, demarcated how the problem of climate change is viewed, discussed and addressed (see Myerson and Rydin, 1996). In this section, we show how the parameters of the NZETS experiment were determined by the global and national neoliberal order of things: international climate change agreements and national environmental

governance structures that favor depoliticized and marketized management.

5.1. Two terms of uncertainty: 2003–2008

Between 2003 and 2008, the Labour Government steered a protracted phase of policy experimentation about how to address climate change, dominated by a debate over the mitigation mechanisms of carbon tax and carbon market. Labour framed climate mitigation in a strongly aspirational and highly optimistic manner, envisioning a moment in which NZ could ‘lead the world’ in environmental governance and sustainable development (Duynhoven, 2004: 11315; Hodgson, 2005a: 20224; Brash, 2004: 10781; Fitzsimons, 2007: 7765). This aligned with the party's broader political agenda of national achievement, linking emergent global climate governance agreement-making (which includes mitigation as an ethical issue and as an economic issue) with imagined geographies of nation-state (NZ as leader in environmental protection and sustainable development initiatives) as a means to justify state intervention (Parker, 2008a: 963; Benson-Pope, 2006: 2308). NZ's ‘trailblazing’ anti-nuclear stance, for instance, has been actively embedded in the collective consciousness as a praise-worthy contribution to NZ's nationhood and cemented the idea that NZ is able to ‘punch above its weight’ on the global stage (Hopkins et al., 2015; Moyes, 2008). To achieve their ambitions to likewise pioneer GHG emission reductions, Labour, backed by the Green Party, favored a carbon tax, which they promised would see revenue from the tax “go into the economy and achieve other things” (Fitzsimons, 2004: 11315) such as further mitigation ventures (Hodgson, 2005a: 20224). The main mechanism to help achieve such ventures was the Agricultural Emissions Levy Research Fund, proposed in 2002.

With the help of National and ACT politicians, high-emitting sectors, most notably agriculture, made the proposed tax an object of ridicule, dubbing it a “fart tax” (Smith, 2003: 7149). Their resistance to the so-called “draconian measure” (Baldock, 2005: 19251) received international media coverage, with protests involving four hundred farmers and twenty tractors blocking the streets of Wellington and a tractor being driven up the steps of Parliament by National MP Shane Ardern (O'Neil, 2015; Bullock, 2012). These stunts were simultaneously acts of protests and expressions of particularly powerful subjectivities, stories, and practices in NZ society; they served to signal and reproduce the narrative of NZ as an agricultural nation, and that politicians should (and do) cater to the agricultural sector at the expense of other sectors and interest groups (Jacobson et al., 2014; Kelly, 2010). In parliamentary debates, National and ACT MPs argued that the carbon tax (and later Labour's ETS) was further evidence of Labour's “command-and-control” style of governance, which in punishing the agricultural sector punished the NZ economy by extension (Carter, 2008a: 16675). These concerns about potentially disadvantaging NZ businesses (particularly because NZ's major trading partners were not subject to a carbon tax) as well as passing costs onto consumers (Brown, 2005: 18374; Baldock, 2005: 19251), were shared by Labour's support parties, NZ First and United Future. This forced Labour to abandon the proposed policy following the 2005 election.

Despite outwardly opposing many of the values that surround marketization such as ‘less state’ and cuts to welfare, Labour nevertheless “concur[red] with having a reinvigorated private sector and an open economy plugged into the prevailing neoliberal global economic grid” (Graham, 2011: 19085), in line with their center-right counterpart (O'Connor, 2014: 18061). Although both carbon tax and NZETS represented an unprecedented and experimental mitigation approach, the additional stigma attached to the fundamental notion of a carbon tax within this national ‘grid’ instigated convergence “across the political spectrum” on a market mechanism (English, 2007: 12088).

The ensuing “policy vacuum” (Turei, 2006: 3703) before the hasty enactment into law of the NZETS just before the November 2008 election meant the scheme had not been trialed or tested before it

became policy, nor had NZ made concrete inroads into mitigation. In this way, from (before) its inception the NZETS was a state experiment in the mitigation of climate change and climate governance in NZ. Fig. 1 summarizes this experimentation and outlines key moments in the scheme's enactment and subsequent amendments.

5.2. Three terms of weakening: 2008–2016

Upon assuming government in 2008, National swiftly readjusted the NZETS policy settings to align with their own climate governance agenda, which included declining to ratify CP2 of the Kyoto Protocol and reforming environmental governance more broadly (Richter and Mundaca, 2014; Price and Duffin, 2013; Kelly, 2010). National's agenda was framed around NZ “not being a laggard nor being a world leader,” but instead “doing our fair share” (Smith, 2009b: 5752) in global mitigation. In particular, National depicted NZ's small (economic) size and “distinctive (GHG) emissions profile” (Hobbs, 2007: 12403; Joyce, 2013: 7696; Bullock, 2012) as barriers to stringent mitigation and a justification for prioritizing further growth, particularly following the Global Financial Crisis (Graham, 2010; Hague, 2013: 10411; Groser, 2014a: 15692). National framed NZ's primary production as paramount and promoted the capability of NZ farming to ‘feed the world’ (Hutchison, 2009: 6854). This overriding political agenda connected ongoing concerns about food security (where food production is a moral responsibility and a matter of global security) with NZ's long-standing agriculture-centred economy (NZ as a leader in industrial agricultural efficiency), and deflected attention away from the issue of climate change (Genter, 2016: 9531). The emphasis on production complemented National's energy-intensive regime of “subsidising fossil fuels and promoting coal mining” (Hughes, 2016: 9306; Diprose et al., 2016) in an attempt to “lift the country's productivity” (Blue, 2009: 4849).

Not denying climate change, as certain conservative political groups elsewhere have done, National followed suit with the broad acceptance of climate change in NZ (Hopkins et al., 2015: 562). Nonetheless, National sought to further “minimise compliance costs” (Parker, 2008c: 18075) for high emitting industries (agriculture and heavy industry) “while providing certainty for economic growth” (Flavell, 2009: 6854). Some of National's NZETS amendments thus included: heavy subsidization schemes; deferral of entry for the agricultural sector; and slackening of regulatory settings, resulting in the trade of “cheap international units” (Mackey, 2014: 18055; Hopkins et al., 2015; Cooper and Rosin, 2014). Significantly, the adjustments made essentially left the scheme with no overall cap on emissions, meaning the NZETS could not be defined as a true cap-and-trade scheme (Bertram and Terry, 2010). Rather than climate change being additionally seen as an economic problem (Hague, 2009: 1084), it was reduced to one (Cunliffe, 2015) and became, “in principle, no different from any other economic change” (English, 2009c: 1697) that required fiscal management. National's ‘least-cost’ approach, which meant the NZETS was to meet, foremost, economic criteria that included “clear economic and productivity benefits” (English, 2009a: 1302), produced a scheme that has failed to significantly reduce NZ's emissions (see Fig. 2).

5.3. Regulating to deregulate?

On one hand, both main parties appropriated mitigation to further their respective political agendas. In characterizing climate change as an exceptional issue, both parties rationalized state intervention and centralized control over NZ's response. On the other hand, the creation of the NZETS demonstrated a desire to depoliticize the issue of climate change in order to render it manageable and beyond the reach of “messy situational politics” (Manuel-Navarrete, 2010: 782). Further, the use of parliamentary urgency (by both parties) reflected both these objectives concurrently: the mechanism served to push their political agendas through via the bypassing of the regular parliamentary

procedures associated with passing and amending legislation and what these entail, namely time (and therefore opportunities for reflection) and political deliberation (Geiringer et al., 2011). Following Callon (2010), the NZETS, like all markets (and particularly as an instrument of the state), is caught in a concurrently scientific, economic and political tension between stabilising and innovating, reproducing and re-configuring. As it is made, remade and enacted chiefly through the mechanism of parliament, we examine the ways in which the creation and operation of the NZETS involved (strategic) State interventions into the supposedly free market of carbon trading (Bertram and Terry, 2010; see also Swyngedouw, 2013, 2009).

5.4. Exceptionalism: state of uncertainty

Both NZ's main political parties framed climate change as an exceptional and deeply uncertain phenomenon requiring direct intervention by the state. While this shows there was an underlying agreement that climate change presents a challenge to be addressed, diverging interpretations of the risks and uncertainties posed resulted in diverging policies and NZETS settings (see Smith, 2009a: 1403; English, 2009b: 1527). The Labour/National dichotomy distinguishes different approaches to conceptualizations of risk in relation to the NZ economy. For Labour, failing to act could lead to missed opportunities to transition to a green economy and to diversify NZ's economy (Sage, 2016: 9972; Clark, 2007: 7237): “the major risk to us will be if we do not take action quickly enough” (Norman, 2009: 1609). Conversely, for National, acting could risk the economy, growth and jobs, especially considering NZ's “distinctive greenhouse gas emissions profile” (Hobbs, 2007: 12403). Each side of this dichotomy used uncertainties at the international level: that is, what may emerge from future deliberations and what has thus far failed to emerge from international climate negotiations, in order to argue that NZ needed to proceed with, respectively, haste and caution. The NZETS, in bringing the emergent science and politics of climate change to market supplied further uncertainty to an already unpredictable matrix (Callon, 2009).

The introduction of the NZETS did not translate into increased certainty about either the governance of climate change mitigation or the practical implementation of policy designed to reduce GHG emissions. Indeed, the comprehensive coverage of sectors and GHGs under the NZETS (see Fig. 2) set new challenges for governance because of the associated administration and operation (Bertram and Terry, 2010). Labour's original NZETS legislation, which was supposed to provide certainty about how NZ would mitigate climate change and meet its international commitment to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, left a number of key points of the scheme unclear. This included technical and metrological problems such as potential for incommensurability of NZ Units with overseas units that might render the scheme subject to the vagaries of global markets, as well as a series of miscalculations concerning NZ's Kyoto Protocol liabilities (Moyes, 2008). Likewise, the 2009 decision by the National Government to impose a temporary “suspension of the [NZ]ETS” (Chauvel, 2009a) to review the scheme (see Fig. 1) compounded the lack of clarity about its operations. This resulted in, for instance, the loss of deals for forest owners and investors (Fitzsimons, 2009) and the sale of the NZ Stock Exchange carbon registry (Chauvel, 2009b), which shifted the uncertainty (and exceptionalism) across time and across sectors. This lack of certainty in the institutional arrangements of the NZETS is traceable to the hasty design and passage of the bill through parliament under the urgency mechanism.

5.5. Exceptionalism: state of urgency

The genealogy of the NZETS under both governments is punctuated with episodes of parliamentary urgency (Budget Day urgency, end of year/Christmas urgency, error-amending urgency, pre- and post-change-of-government urgency), which had repercussions for the

scheme and its operationalisation, as well as for environmental governance in NZ more broadly (Geiringer et al., 2011). The use of urgency reflects the desire for efficiency in terms of both the policy-making process and for the implementation of those policies. Efficiency is a significant aspect of the post-political condition and is closely aligned to expertization and rendering technical (Dardot and Laval, 2013). Efficient decision-making is upheld as desirable not only in administrative and economic terms (for instance, the finalization of the NZETS policy settings to provide certainty for industry, businesses and investors (Brownlee, 2016: 1; Bennett, 2016: 1)), but in moral terms. As such, efficiency is understood as a given operating principle, an overriding state responsibility and as vital to the successful functioning of democratic society (Thomas and Bond, 2016; see also Swyngedouw, 2010). As the ‘doctrine of efficiency’ is coupled with democracy itself, the democratic processes of both public discussion and adequate parliamentary debate are truncated (Graham, 2012: 4746), and dissent, a form of democratic engagement, is recast as anti-democratic (Jessop, 2002: 456; see also Splichal, 2009). Frequent use of the urgency parliamentary mechanism thus indicates state control is becoming increasingly exceptional (Thomas and Bond, 2016) and, in the case of the NZETS, the state thoroughly and overtly intervenes in market processes and climate matters (Bertram and Terry, 2010; see also Swyngedouw, 2009, 2013).

The uncertainty of climate change became not only a justification for urgency around climate legislation but an impetus for fast-tracking decision-making in other (related) arenas (Hodgson, 2008: 15258), notably regarding economic sectors such as forestry and agriculture. Labour contended that “changes taking place in the economy need to go further and faster” (Clark, 2004: 10781). Their “initiatives like the ‘Permanent Forest Sink’...[which supposedly had] the potential to attract many millions of dollars of investment into the NZ economy” (Hodgson, 2005b: 20412), reflected the party’s optimistic, win-win vision of sustainable development helping to sustain development (see Lele, 1991) and boost “progress against key indicators” (Clark, 2005a: 18149). National’s immediate NZETS suspension and subsequent amendments were foremost concerned with aiding and, in the case of agriculture, placating (Jacobson et al., 2014; Kelly, 2010) economic interests in the shortest time-frame possible. Their NZETS policy settings “encouraged the rapid intensification of commercial agriculture and the irrigation of our iconic landscapes” (Walker, 2012: 445), openly promising that “[i]f companies cut their production, their [subsidy] allocations will drop. If they grow, their allocation will increase” (Smith, 2009c: 6854; see Fig. 2).

The various uses of and excuses for urgency raise important questions around the acceptability of entering into a state of exception based on what the government deems to be legitimate grounds. Indeed, “there is a qualitative difference between the process by which a bill is developed by the Government... and the parliamentary process by which [a bill is]... digested and debated by colleagues on all benches” (Graham, 2012: 4746). Adopting the stance of Geiringer et al. (2011) that the foreshortening of full procedures, especially the select committee stage, is largely undesirable outside ‘emergency’ situations, the question then becomes whether or not climate change constitutes an emergency or threat that legitimates using urgency. Consensus within the House of Representatives around how pressing climate change is remains elusive (Graham, 2013: 11062) and disparate priorities have resulted in differential justifications for the use of urgency.

5.6. Expertization

A further tactic deployed by both center parties to override the uncertainties associated with climate change and the vagaries of political opinion was the deferral to expertise. In employing independent technical, scientific and economic knowledge (and the associated language and figures), they sought to frame the NZETS (and mitigation more generally) as a technical project, the domain of economists and

scientists rather than politicians or members of the public. This involved the creation of a presumed ‘common sense’ rather than opening up a space for critical thinking, a key aspect of the post-political neoliberal condition according to Springer (2015). While alternative climate action exists in NZ and various mitigation ventures operate independent of the NZETS, these have not been made part of the dominant narrative of mitigation in NZ as the State has called the NZETS the main apparatus for reducing emissions (Bridges, 2014: 18055). Alternative political mobilizations have thus entered the parliamentary debate as supplementary ideas to bolster politicians’ arguments around climate policy, which are either dismissed as radical and unrealistic or claimed as evidence of NZ’s desire to address climate change. Removing the discussion and decision-making from broader spheres generates the potential for information to become contained within esoteric spheres aligned with the government’s agenda (see Bridges, 2013: 12581). In legislation for (technical) markets like the NZETS, this tends to mean that “the bits that actually matter are usually highly technical provisions formally contained in footnotes and annexes that only the high priests can understand” (Groser, 2008a: 18609; Clendon, 2010: 15715; see also Key, 2012: 6492). In the case of the NZETS, the state thus defined the trajectory and parameters of the experiment and strategically justified what risks required attention and counted nationally (see Manuel-Navarrete, 2010; see also Li, 2007a).

Expertization and rendering technical (Li, 2005) serves political expediency in a post-political era in which overt governmental intervention is widely condemned, most strongly by the very governing bodies who then need to find a way around this hurdle (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014). Expertise can be upheld as beyond reproof or questioning (Clark, 2005b: 21820) yet can be conveniently dismissed as subjective when it fails to produce desired results, allowing decision-makers to avoid accountability (Swyngedouw, 2009; Grundmann, 2007). The Environmental Protection Authority (EPA), the agency responsible for overseeing the operations of the NZETS (see Fig. 2), is a governing body that epitomizes this tension between state/non-state and where accountability ultimately lies. This independent, technical body was heavily promoted by successive National governments because for them it “reinforces the importance of good scientific and technical skills to effective environmental regulation; it recognizes the importance of efficient environmental regulation to our economy” (Smith, 2011: 17862; Doelle et al., 2012). For National, incorporating advice from such bodies into policies offered a way to keep amendments “sufficiently technical” (English, 2008: 18075) so as to avoid the overt intervention of legislative changes. Labour’s support of independent expertise and opinion was less overt, offering a way for them to prove an ideological differentiation (on the issue of regulation) from their politically central counterpart. Tracing a critical genealogy of the NZETS under the direction of both parties, however, we have shown that, alongside the tactics of exceptionalism and urgency, the rendering technical of climate change mitigation under both parties enabled the scheme to be thoroughly controlled by the state.

6. Conclusion

The NZETS is the NZ state’s main apparatus in the mitigation of climate change (Bridges, 2014: 18055), and its creation a key moment in the history of environmental governance more broadly in NZ. By critically examining state level discourses and pronouncements pertaining to the NZETS, this paper demonstrates how the state (through successive governments) sought to define the contours of climate change problem-definition and proposed solutions in ways that constrained non-technical perspectives and ultimately sought to reinforce the socio-economic status quo (high emitting, agricultural industry-centred). Our chronology of events in the creation and re-configuration of the NZETS highlights that in practice both major political parties have treated the NZETS as something akin to a state-run market enterprise. Rather than neatly rendering mitigation technical and the

domain of independent experts, the result is a market mechanism with a genealogy consisting of multiple political projects that exists to the periphery of wider processes of post-political neoliberalisms and has become a place of experimentation for economic, scientific and government actors alike. Our analysis of the operations of the NZETS therefore epitomizes reinforces the findings of other scholars (Callon, 2009; Fletcher, 2010; Swyngedouw, 2013), who demonstrate that despite a “techno-managerial” consensus (Swyngedouw, (2013: 4–5). In NZ the persistence of the idea(l) of ‘less state’, climate change continues to be appropriated for political leverage, thereby problematizing the notion of the post-political more broadly.

We specifically probed the ways in which the NZ state justifies and legitimizes intervention within a post-political governance framework. In the broadest sense, intervention was legitimized because climate change was framed as an exceptional phenomenon steeped in uncertainty and its mitigation therefore a global experiment (see Callon, 2009). State intervention was also rationalized by a post-political neoliberal definition of good governance, significant components of which are expertise and efficiency of decision-making (see Splichal, 2009). Both Labour and National altered standard parliamentary processes under the banners of exceptionalism, uncertainty and urgency to establish the NZETS. This was evident in the use of parliamentary urgency to pass and amend legislation, but also in the more general narrowing of the spaces for democracy through deferral to private

sector (unelected) experts and the placating of powerful industries (agriculture and heavy industry) with vested interests in emitting GHGs, despite the existence of alternative yet oftentimes less powerful, unheard or silenced non-state voices in NZ.

The central government’s interventions into the ‘free’ market operations of the NZETS that we have documented here are part of a wider trend in NZ’s environmental governance regimes (see Thomas and Bond, 2016). The normalisation of exceptionalised and technocratised practices and policies raises concerns for democracy and legitimacy as it serves to diminish democratic processes of public discussion and deliberative debates. Our NZ case study therefore contributes to a growing body of scholarship which contends that, when democratic procedures are ‘exceptionalised’ (centralised and foreshortened) in the name of streamlining and efficiency, the claims to depoliticisation and ‘less state’ are rendered dangerous because, in actuality, the state is thoroughly in control of decision- and policy-making (see Thomas and Bond, 2016; Bruff, 2014; Geiringer et al., 2011). Accordingly, the space for critical analysis and debate both inside and outside parliament is constrained. Since the final say is held by the government of the day, democratic deliberations are substituted by expert management and calculation that take place in scientific and economic spheres (Centeno and Cohen, 2012). This process is a crucial aspect of the post-political condition, and is critiqued for the movement away from democratic practices towards authoritarianism (Springer, 2015).

Appendix A Table of NZ Parliamentary Debates from 2003 to 2016 on climate change and NZETS from which relevant data was produced

Year	Volume	Debate title
2003	606	Debate on Prime Minister’s Statement
		International Treaties Bill – Second Reading
	608	Resource Management Amendment Bill (No. 2) – Second Reading
	609	Questions for Oral Answer
	610	Estimates Debate: Vote Biosecurity Estimates Debate: Vote Climate Change and Energy Efficiency
2004	615	Debate on Prime Minister’s Statement
		Prime Minister’s Statement
		Questions for Oral Answer
		Resource Management (Energy and Climate Change) Amendment Bill – Instruction to Committee, In Committee
	616	Urgent Debates – Energy – Project Aqua Cancellation
	617	Budget Debate
	618	General Debate
	619	General Debate
		Questions for Oral Answer
	620	Third Readings
2005	621	General Debate
		Transport Legislation Bill – Second Reading
	623	Prime Minister’s Statement
	624	General Debate
	625	Climate Change Response Amendment Bill – First Reading
		Questions for Oral Answer
	626	Budget Debate
		Debate on Crown Entities, Public Organisations, and State Enterprises – In Committee: Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority
	627	Urgent Debates – Greenhouse Gas Emissions – Release of Report
		Questions for Oral Answer
2006	628	Questions for Oral Answer
		Governor-General Speech
	629	Debate on Prime Minister’s Statement
		Questions for Oral Answer
		Taxation (Depreciation, Payment Dates Alignment, FBT, and Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill – Second Reading
	630	Questions for Oral Answer
		Resource Management (Climate Protection) Amendment Bill – First Reading

	631	Budget Debate
	632	Supplementary Estimates – Imprest Supply Debate
	634	Appropriation (Parliamentary Expenditure Validation) Bill – First Reading, Second Reading, In Committee Climate Change Response Amendment Bill – Second Reading General Debate
2007	637	Debate on Prime Minister's Statement Prime Minister's Statement Questions for Oral Answer
	638	Questions for Oral Answer
	639	Budget Debate Questions for Oral Answer
	640	Questions for Oral Answer
	641	Questions for Oral Answer
	642	Biofuel Bill – First Reading Questions for Oral Answer Urgent Debates – Emissions Trading Scheme – Government Announcement
	643	Questions for Oral Answer
	644	Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill – First Reading Dairy Industry Restructuring Amendment Bill (No 2) – Second Reading, In Committee, Third Reading
2008	645	Debate on Budget Policy Statement Debate on Prime Minister's Statement Prime Minister's Statement Questions for Oral Answer
	646	Financial Review Debate – In Committee Questions for Oral Answer
	647	Budget Debate General Debate Questions for Oral Answer Resource Management (Climate Protection) Amendment Bill – Second Reading Taxation (Personal Tax Cuts, Annual Rates, and Remedial Matters) Bill – First Reading, Second Reading, In Committee
	648	General Debate Questions for Oral Answer Supplementary Estimates – Imprest Supply Debate Taxation (International Taxation, Life Insurance, and Remedial Matters) Bill – First Reading
	649	Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill – In Committee Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill – Second Reading Questions for Oral Answer
	650	Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill – In Committee Settlement Systems, Futures and Emissions Units Bill – First Reading Urgency
	651	Electricity (Renewable Preference) Repeal Bill – First Reading
2009	652	Address in Reply General Debate Questions for Oral Answer Resource Management (Simplifying and Streamlining) Amendment Bill – First Reading Taxation (Business Tax Measures) Bill – First Reading
	653	Questions for Oral Answer
	654	Budget Debate Debate on Crown Entities, Public Organisations, and State Enterprises – In Committee
	655	Climate Change (Transport Funding) Bill – First Reading Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading Forestry Sector) Amendment Bill – Second Reading, In Committee, Third Reading Questions for Oral Answer Resource Management (Climate Protection) Amendment Bill – Second Reading
	656	Estimates Debate – In Committee Questions for Oral Answer Sustainable Biofuel Bill – First Reading
	657	Climate Change Response (Moderated Emissions Trading) Amendment Bill – First Reading General Debate
	659	Climate Change Response (Moderated Emissions Trading) Amendment Bill – In Committee, Third Reading Urgency
2010	660	Debate on Prime Minister's Statement
	662	Offices of Parliament, Address to Governor-General Questions for Oral Answer Tariff (Malaysia Free Trade Agreement) Amendment Bill – First Reading

	663	General Debate
		Questions for Oral Answer
	664	Appropriation (2009/10 Supplementary Estimates) Bill, Imprest Supply (First for 2010/11) Bill – Second Reading
		Questions for Oral Answer
	665	Estimates Debate – In Committee
	667	Electricity Industry Bill – Third Reading
	668	General Debate
	669	Environmental Protection Authority Bill – First Reading
		Questions for Oral Answer
		Research, Science, and Technology Bill, National Library of New Zealand (Te Puna Matauranga o Aotearoa) Amendment
2011	670	Debate on Prime Minister's Statement
	671	Airports (Cost Recovery for Processing of International Travellers) Bill – Second Reading
		Environmental Protection Authority Bill – Second Reading
	672	Third Readings
	673	General Debate
	675	Duties of Statutory Officers (Census and Other Remedial Provisions) Bill – First Reading, Second Reading, In Committee
2012	677	Address in Reply
	678	General Debate
		Questions for Oral Answer
	679	Debate on Budget Policy Statement
	680	Budget Debate
	683	Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading and Other Matters) Amendment Bill – First Reading
		Questions for Oral Answer
	684	Crown Minerals (Permitting and Crown Land) Bill – First Reading
		Questions for Oral Answer
	685	Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading and Other Matters) Amendment Bill – Second Reading
		Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading and Other Matters) Amendment Bill – In Committee
		General Debate
		Questions for Oral Answer
	686	Climate Change (New Zealand Superannuation Fund) Bill – First Reading
2013	687	Debate on Prime Minister's Statement
		Questions for Oral Answer
	688	Financial Review Debate – In Committee
		Questions for Oral Answer
	690	Budget Debate
		Crown Minerals Amendment Act 2013 Amendment Bill – First Reading, Second Reading, In Committee
		Questions for Oral Answer
	691	General Debate
		Supplementary Estimates – Imprest Supply Debate
	692	Estimates Debate – In Committee
		Questions for Oral Answer
		Resource Management Reform Bill – In Committee
	693	Public Finance (Fiscal Responsibility) Amendment Bill – In Committee, Third Reading
	694	Conservation (Natural Heritage Protection) Bill – Third Reading
2014	696	Debate on Prime Minister's Statement
		Environmental Reporting Bill – First Reading
		Questions for Oral Answer
	697	General Debate
	698	Budget Measures (Miscellaneous Fiscal Matters) Bill – First Reading, Second Reading, In Committee
		Cheque Duty Repeal Bill, Climate Change Response (Unit Restriction) Amendment Bill, Dumping and Countervailing Duties Amendment Bill (No 2) – Third Reading
		General Debate
		Questions for Oral Answer
	699	Questions for Oral Answer
		Supplementary Estimates – Imprest Supply Debate
	700	Estimates Debate – In Committee
	701	Address in Reply
	702	General Debate
2015	704	General Debate
	705	Budget Debate
	706	Environmental Protection Authority (Protection of Environment) Amendment Bill – First Reading
		Environmental Reporting Bill – In Committee
		Questions for Oral Answer

707	Estimates Debate
708	Questions for Oral Answer
709	International Finance Agreements Amendment Bill – First Reading
710	Questions for Oral Answer
2016 711	Debate on Budget Policy Statement
	General Debate
712	New Zealand Horticulture Export Authority Amendment Bill – First Reading
714	Budget Debate
	Climate Change Response (Removal of Transitional Measure) Amendment Bill – First Reading, Second Reading, In Committee, Third Reading
	Urgency

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